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Bloodworth: First Amendment Infringement

NOTES

NEW YORK V. FERBER:
COMPELLING EXTENSION OF
FIRST AMENDMENT
INFRINGEMENT.
INTRODUCTION

In New York v. Ferber,l the United States Supreme Court
conducted its first inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute
"directed at and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving children. "I Paul Ferber, owner of a Manhattan bookstore
specializing in sexually oriented material, sold two films to an
undercover police officer. The films chiefly depicted young boys
masturbating. Ferber was indicted under New York statutes regulating child pornography.- Ferber was subsequently acquitted
of the section 263.10 charge, which required a finding that the
material at issue be obscene, and convicted under section 263.15,
for which no proof of obscenity was required.· The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction without opinion. s
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding section
263.15 violative of the first amendment.s The court reasoned
that given a different penal code section's explicit inclusion of an
obscenity requirement, the statute employed to convict the defendant impliedly regulated only nonobscene child pornogra1. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
2. rd. at 3353.
3. The trial judge rejected Ferber's first amendment attack on the two sections in
denying a motion to dismiBB the indictment. 96 Misc. 2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978).
4. See notes 24 and 26, supra.
6. 72 A.D.2d 668, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980).
6. 62 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981).
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phy.7 As the traditional standard for exclusion from first amendment protection is predicated on a finding that the material at
issue be obscene, the court concluded that the statute in question targeted a form of expression entitled to first amendment
protection. 8
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the New
York Appellate Court's decision, upholding the constitutionality
of the statute on the grounds that the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its youth outweighed any first amendment interests at stake. 9 Given that the defendant was prosecuted under
a statute which did not require that the proscribed depiction be
obscene, the United States Supreme Court's opinion marked a
clear departure from the obscenity standard previously used for
determining first amendment applicability.lo Particularly important in this regard is the Court's lack of reverence for constitutional sanctity when concerning state regulation of child pornography. The state's interest in providing for the health and wellbeing of its youth may currently, under the appropriate circumstances, be so overwhelming as to deny an individual rights
heretofore available under the first amendment. This note seeks
both to define the particular forms of expression involving
juveniles which, according to the Court, do not warrant constitutional protection, and to question the Court's rationale in setting
precedent which narrows the scope of the first amendment.
OBSCENITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO

Ferber

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,l1 the United States Supreme Court recognized that particular well-defined areas of expression are not entitled to constitutional protection.1:I For the
first time the Court clearly articulated that obscenity is outside
the realm of constitutionally protected expression, reasoning
that the societal and moral interest in regulating obscene material clearly outweighs any social value possibly derived from the
7. Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
8.ld.
9. 102 S. Ct. at 3357.
10.ld.
11. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
12. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problems. These include the .lewd and obscene . . . . n Id. at 572.
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lawful existence and dissemination of such material. 18
The Supreme Court again refused first amendment protection for obscenity in Roth v. United States,I4 stating that speech
without socially redeeming value had historically, albeit implicitly, been excluded from constitutional protection. I I Yet, in a
subsequent case the Court was unable to evade "the intractable
obscenity problem. "UI Despite the judicially formulated rule that
obscenity is utterly without social value and, therefore, beyond
the auspices of the first amendment, there remained the question of which materials and activities were "obscene."
In Miller v. California,l"I the Supreme Court voiced new
guidelines for the purpose of excising obscene material from first
amendment protection. Acknowledging "the inherent dangers of
undertaking to regulate any form of expression,"11 the Court
modified the per se rule of Roth, which exempted all obscene
forms of expression from constitutional coverage, and asserted
the need for substantive limitations on the permissible scope of
regulation. The Court stated that "a state offense must also be
limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."11 While imposing these
limitations, the Court also shifted its standard from "utterly"
without social value to without "serious" social value. This shift
was most significant in that it. reflected the Court's increasing
willingness to tamper with its social value inquiry and, in so doing, restrict first amendment applicability.
13. Jd.

14. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
15.
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity 88 utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in
the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity lawS of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws
enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.
Jd. at 485.
16. Interstate Circuit, Inc. V. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.).
17. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
18. Jd. at 23.
19. Jd. at 24.
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THE NEW YORK OPINION

The initial issue before New York Court of Appeals was the
appropriateness of the defendant's overbreadth attack. The
court noted that where first amendment rights are at issue, a
party may generally challenge the constitutionality of a statute
"on its face," despite the fact that the party's own rights are not
violated under the particular circumstances of the case. 20 The
court acknowledged the view stated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,21
that an overbreadth attack is more stringent in its application to
conduct than to "pure speech."22 Nevertheless, the court chose
to view the statute as being aimed at "traditional forms of expression,"23 thereby allowing the defendant to challenge the
statute's constitutionality.
The court of appeals began its substantive inquiry by considering whether section 263.15 regulated expression traditionally entitled to protection under the first amendment. 2 ' After
finding that a companion provision directly prohibited the
knowing dissemination of obscene material, the court concluded
that section 263.15 specifically targeted nonobscene material. 211
Hence, the court found that the statute prohibited the promotion of materials traditionally afforded constitutional protection. lI6
20. 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65, citing Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973), (first amendment concerns compel the adjudication
of overbreadth challenges).
21. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
22. 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65, citing 413 U.S. at
614-15. See note 62, supra.
23. ld. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65.
24. "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing
the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.15 (West 1980). "Promote means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide,
lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, prevent, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same." ld. at § 263.5. "Sexual
performance means any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a
child less than sixteen years of age." ld. at § 263.1. "Sexual conduct means actual or
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." ld. at § 263.3.
25. 52 N.Y.2d at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. "A person is guilty of
promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and
content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes obscene sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10
(West 1980).
26. 52 N.Y.2d at 678, 42.2 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
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The court cO,ntinued by recognizing that "First Amendment
rights are not absolute and may on occasion be outweighed by
superior government interests."lI'1 It further asserted that "[t]he
State has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of minors within its borders, and, at times, that interest may transcend first amendment concerns."18 As section 263.15 sought to
regulate the depiction of juvenile sex without regard for the jurisdiction in which those depictions were recorded, the court
found the statute to be overbroad in its application.I . To the
extent that the New York Legislature's purpose in enacting section 263.15 was interpreted by the court as the protection of adolescents from danger to their health and well-being, the court
found the statute to be under inclusive on the ground that it
didn't uniformly accomplish its purpose. so That is, the statute
discriminated against sexually oriented t~es of juvenile abuse.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION

Justice White, delivering the unanimous oplDlOn of the
Court, began by asserting that the New York Court of Appeals
proceeded on the assumption that the guidelines espoused in
Miller applied when ascertaining the constitutionality of child
pornography laws. 81 The Court observed that 44 [t]he Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the
State's interest in protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipients from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of
censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws."sa Prefacing its departure from the Miller standard, the Court expressed its conviction that "states are. entitled to greater leeway
in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children. "88 The
Court subsequently engaged in a five-point analysis in support
of its conclusion.
In its first point the Court affirmed that states have a "compelling" interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological
27. rd.
28. rd. at 679, 422 N.E.2d at 525-26, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
29. rd. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65.
30. rd. at 679-80, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 3352.
32. rd. at 3353.
33. rd.
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well-being of a minor."84 As authority for its determination the
Court cited pertinent common law developments,8lI as well as the
New York State Legislature's findings on the subject. 86 Moreover, the opinion found that according to both legislative findings and relevant literature, "the use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child."s7
34. Id., citing Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
35. The Court began with the premise that "a democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon a healthy well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens." Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3354, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
Further, the Court referred to situations in which the state's interest in protecting the
well-being of minors was sustained notwithstanding adverse effects on free speech. See
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
36.
There has been a proliferation of children as subjects in sexual
performances. The care of children is a sacred trust and
should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a
commercial network based on the exploitation of children.
The public policy of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation through sexual performances.
N.Y. PENAL LAW, ch. 910 § 1 (McKinney 1977). The legislature additionally found:
[T)he sale of these movies, magazines, and photographs depicting the sexual conduct of children to be so abhorrent to
the fabric of our society that it urges law enforcement officers
to aggreBBively seek out and prosecute both the peddlers of
children and the promoters of this filth by vigorously applying
the sanctions contained in this act.
Id.
37.
The use of children as ... subjects of pornographic materials
is very harmful to both the children and the society as a
whole. S. Rep. No. 95-438, p. 5 (1978). It has been found that
sexually exploited children are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions,
and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults.
Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography,
19 J. Am. Acad. Child Psych. 239, 296 (1980); ... Schoettle,
Treatment of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 Am. J.
Psych. 1109, 1110 (1980); Dansen-Gerner, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography: Medical, Legal and Societal Aspects
of the Commercial Exploitation of Children, reprinted in U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Sexual Abuse of Children: Selected Readings at 80 (1980) ... (sexually exploited
children pre-disposed to self-destructive behavior such as drug
and alcohol abuse or prostitution). See generally A. Burgess &
L. Holmstrom, AcceBBory-to-Sex: Pressure, Sex and Secrecy, in
BurgeBB, Sexual ABBault of Children and Adolescents 85, 94
(1978); V. DeFrancis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex
Crimes Committed by Adults, 169 (1969); Ellerstein &
Canavan, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 134 Am. J. Diseases of Children 255, 256-257 (1980); Finch, Adult Seduction of the Child:
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In its second point, the Court declared that the distribution
of recorded sexual performances involving children is inherently
associated with the exploitation and abuse of children in at least
two ways.8S First, the dissemination of materials depicting sexual
performances of children exacerbates the harmful effects upon
those children stemming from the existence of a permanent record of their acts. Second, the opinion stated that channels of
circulation must be closed in order to effectively curtail the
abuse of children targeted by the statute. 89
The majority ended its discussion on distribution by explicitly rejecting application of the Miller standard in the realm of
child pornography.'o The Court affirmed the state's contention
that the Miller standard is not dispositive given the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of its youth. 41 The
Court noted that whether the work as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex, whether the specific depictions are patently offensive or whether the work as a whole contains serious
social value, bears no significance when ascertaining the harm
suffered by juvenile participants.'s
The third point involved the advertising and selling of child
pornography. The Court essentially stated that freedom of
speech cannot be at issue where the expression challenged is
part of an effort to promote illegal commercial activity." The
Effects on the Child, 7 Med. Aspects of Human Sexuality 170,
185 (1973); Groth, Sexual Trauma in the Life Histories of
Rapists and Child Molestors, 4 Victimology 10 (1979). Sexual
molestation by adults is often involved in the production of
child sexual performances. Sexual Exploitation of Children, A
Report to Illinois General Assembly by the Illinois Legislative
Investigatory Comm'n at 30-31 (1980) ... When such performances are recorded and distributed, the child's privacy interests are also invaded.
102 S. Ct. at 3355.
38.ld.
39. The Court noted that thirty-five states and Congress have concluded that such
restraints on distribution are required to effectively combat child pornography. ld.
40. The Court referred to the defendant's argument that the prohibition of distributing obscene materials would suffice as a means of combating child pornography. ld. at
3357. Yet, why the Miller standard should be explicitly rejected within the context of
distribution controls is unclear.
41. ld. at 3357.
42. ld. at 3357-58.
43. "It has rarely been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
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opinion additionally noted that, as with the distribution, the
regulation of advertising and selling was necessitated by the lack
of enforceable production laws. 44
In its fourth point, the Court stated, "The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if
not de minimis."4t! In dismissing any question as to whether the
statute proscribed a particular literary theme, the Court observed that various alternatives to using children in sexual portrayals would not result in the censorship of socially valuable
expression on the subject of children and sexuality.46 The Court
concluded that "[t]he First Amendment interest is limited to
that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more realistic by
utilizing or photographing children."47
In its fifth and final point, the Court found, "Recognizing
and classifying child pornography as a category of material
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions." 48 The opinion added that it was
not rare to accept the constitutionality of content-based proscription, where within the confines of the classification the evil
to be restricted overwhelmingly outweighed any expressive interest at stake. 49 In concluding, it found that "[w]hen a definable class of material, such as that covered by section 263.15,
bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these
violation of a valid criminal statute." Gibony v. Empire Storage & Ice. Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 3357.
45. [d.

46.

We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children
performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals
would often constitute an important and necessary part of a
literary performance or scientific or educational work. As the
trial court in this case observed, if it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside the
prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative.

[d.

47. [d. at 3357-58.
48. [d. at 3358.
49. [d.
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materials as without the protection of the First Amendment."10
The Court enunciated limitations on state regulation of
child pornography by means of amending the Miller standard:
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: a trier of fact need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the
average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive
manner; the material at issue need not be considered as a whole. Ol

The Court noted that "the distribution of descriptions or
other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment
protection. "02 The Court also imposed a requirement of scienter
on the part of the defendant for the imposition of criminal
responsibility.
Concerning the statute's alleged underinclusiveness, the majority recognized early in the opinion that "[t]he prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance."os After holding that
section 263.15 sufficiently defines the constitutionally unprotected material subject to regulation, the Court concluded that
"there is nothing unconstitutionally underinclusive about a statute that singles out this category of material for proscription."&4
The Court began its examination of the defendant's overbreadth challenge by reciting the traditional rule that a person
to whom the statute may be applied cannot challenge the statute
on the grounds that it may unconstitutionally apply to others.oo
The Court pointed to its recognition in Broadrick of "two cardinal principles of constitutional order,"" namely, the personal
50.Id.
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 3355.
54. Id. at 3359.
55. Id. at 3360, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960); Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937); Yazoo & M.N.R. Co. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912).
56. 102 S. Ct. at 3360.
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nature of constitutional rights,1I7 and the "prudential limitations" with respect to constitutional adjudication. lIs The Court
added that the prudential limitations both allow the Court to
focus on individual factual settings and give the state courts the
opportunity to construe statutes in order to avoid constitutional
conflicts.III
As an exception to the traditional rule, the opinion found
that the first amendment overbreadth doctrine is justified only
by "weighty countervailing policies."8G One such weighty countervailing policy is the fear of self-censorship.sl The Court
voiced its concern for the far reaching implications of striking a
statute on its face, and noted that the overbreadth doctrine had
previously been employed with hesitation, and then "only as a
last resort."112
The Court accordingly found that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
57. [d. citing McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 429 (1961).
58.
In addition to prudential restraints, the traditional rule is
grounded in Article III limits on the jurisdiction of federal
courts to actual cases and controversies. This Court, as is the
case with all federal courts, "has no jurisdiction to pronounce
any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void,
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound
by two rules to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is applied."
102 S. Ct. at 3360, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21 (1960); Liverpool, New
York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
59. 102 S. Ct. at 3360.
60. [d. at 3361, citiIlg United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,22-23 (1960) (an act of
CongreBB shall not be declared unconstitutional with reference to hypothetical cases).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (in first amendment contexts the courts are inclined to
entertain overbreadth challenges in order to protect against inhibition chilling free
speech); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (overbreadth challenge deemed neceBBMY to prevent chilling of rights for fear of criminal sanctions).
62. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing 413 U.S. at 613 (enforcement of statutes difficult due to
a wide range of constitutional challenges).
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sweep. "88 The opinion further found, as intimated in Broadrick,
that the requirement of substantial overbreadth extended "at
the very least" to situations involving conduct plus speech."
That the overbreadth must be substantial applies to both civil
and criminal prohibitions, as well as in actions seeking declaratory relief. 811 One additional limitation noted by the Court requires that, in potentially severable, impermissibly overbroad
statutes, only that portion found unconstitutional is to be
invalidated. 88
In applying these standards for overbreadth, the majority
held that section 263.15 was not substantially overbroad." With
regard to the New York Court of Appeal's holding that the regulation of child pornography outside state borders is not within
the police powers of the state, the United States Supreme Court
concluded simply that the state may prohibit the distribution of
unprotected materials produced outside the state consistent
with the first amendment. 88
In finding that section 263.15 didn't unduly encroach upon
first amendment rights, the Court viewed the statute as one
whose "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."'· The Court acknowledged that while the statute was
directed at the "hard core of child pornography," a legitimate
concern was raised with respect to medical tests and other educational materials. Nevertheless, the Court questioned how often
it would be necessary to employ children to accommodate educational purposes, and further suggested that the statute's impermissible applications amount to only a "tiny fraction" of the
materials covered under the statute.'70 Finally, the opinion found
63. 102 S. Ct. at 3362, citing 413 U.S. at 615.
M. 102 S. Ct. at 3362. The Supreme Court's analysis thus differed from that of the
Court of Appeala, in that the latter chose to view the statute as directed at "pure
speech," and in so doing facially invalidated the statute without a finding that the overbreadth involved was substantial.
65. 102 S. Ct. at 3363, citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (extension of
standing in first amendment cases should be less lenient in the military contezt).
66. 102 S. Ct. at 3361, citing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of various statutory provisions banning obscene
materiala, despite emtence of unconstitutional provisions under same act).
87. 102 S. Ct. at 3383.
68. 1d. at 3359.
89. 1d. at 3363.
70.1d.
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that any existing overbreadth of section 263.15 "should be cured
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied."TI

Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the opinion, stressed that
the Court's holding did not require New York to exempt material with serious social value, and suggested that the compelling
interests may permit the state to constitutionally regulate forms
of expression without regard for their soCial value. 71 She further
noted that the audience's appreciation of the expression is quite
irrelevant to the state's interest in protecting ininors from sexual
exploitation.'" An exception for depictions with serious social
value would, according to Justice O'Connor, actually increase
the probability of content-based censorship disfavored by the
first amendment. She added that the statute did not seek to censor all expression of child pornography, but only censored that
expression in which children were engaged for the proscribed illicit purposes. 74
In discussing the overbreadth challenge, Justice O'Connor
suggested that the New York statute may be overbroad on the
grounds that it bars depictions which don't threaten the harms
identified by the Court.TO Nonetheless, she also deferred any further inquiry, stating that the potential overbreadth was insufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. T8
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment,
agreed with the majority in finding that the state is afforded
greater leeway in regulating pornography, the promotion of
which harms children.77 They added that the state does not have
such leeway when protecting consenting adults from such material. 78 The two Justices also voiced the opinion that regulation of
71. Id., citing 413 U.S. at 615·16 (Court deferred on overbreadth inquiry where po.
litical activists challenged constitutionality of state merit system act).
72. Id. at 3364.
73.Id.
74.Id.
75.Id.
76.Id.
77.Id.
78. Id. at 3365, citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637, 638 n.6, 642·43 n.IO; Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
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expression with serious redeeming social value would violate the
first amendment, asserting that the state's interest in regulating
depictions of sexually involved children is likely to be far less
compelling where the depictions are serious contributions to art
or science.'19 With respect to the overbreadth attack, the Justices
agreed with the Court in that the tiny fraction of material with
serious social value conceivably within the realm of the statute is
insufficient to justify striking the statute by means of the overbreadth doctrine. 80
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, focused his
opinion on the Court's mode of analysis with respect to the overbreadth challenge. After accepting as "clear" both the constitutionality of criminal prosecution for the defendant's conduct and
the statute's reach into constitutionally protected areas of expression, Justice Stevens addressed the "critical" issue of the
appropriateness of the overbreadth doctrine in a first amendment context. The Justice stated that an inquiry into first
amendment protection demands consideration of both content
and context,81 and noted that the Court made an "empirical"
judgment in concluding that impermissible application of the
statute amounted to only a tiny fraction of material within the
statute's reach. 81
Justice Stevens labeled both the Appellate Court's and the
Supreme Court's mode of analysis as extreme, explaining that
while the Court's approach would deprive an entire film of constitutional protection based only on the existence of one lewd
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3365.
SO.Id.
81. Id.
82.
The Court's analysis is directed entirely at the permissi·
bility of the statute's coverage of non-obscene material. Its
empirical evidence, however, is drawn substantially from congreBBional committee reports that ultimately reached the conclusion that a prohibition against obscene child pornography-coupled with sufficiently stiff sanctions-is an adequate
response to this social problem. The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary concluded that "virtually all of the materials that
are normally considered child pornography are obscene under
current standards," and that "in comparison with this blatant
pornography, non-obscene materials that depict children are
very few and very inconsequential."
Id. at 3365 n.4.
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scene, the Appellate Court's approach in the same instance
would require striking the entire statute on the ground of overbreadth. sa In support of his refusal to entertain the overbreadth
challenge, Justice Stevens asserted that adjudications involving
concrete factual situations tend to be crafted with greater wisdom.B4 Alternatively, Justice Steven's own intermediate approach would refuse to apply the overbreadth doctrine, opting
rather for case-by-case analysis. slI
CRITIQUE

The Court enunciated the new test for child pornography
only insofar as it may be compared to the Miller standard.
The test for child pornography is separate from
the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but
may be compared to it for purpose of clarity. The
Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner;
and the material at issue need not be considered
as a whole. ee

Referring directly to the Miller opinion, the Court stated
that "[a] state offense must also be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."S7 Focusing on the third element of both the
Miller and Ferber tests, i.e., whether the work is to be considered as a whole, one can only conclude from the specific language of the opinions that the Ferber Court's statement "and
the material at issue need not be considered as a whole" refers
to the social value inquiry. Hence, the new formula articulated
in Ferber apparently would remove child pornography from first
amendment protection, provided that the content to be regulated is adequately defined by state law, that sexual conduct in83. rd.
84. rd.
85. rd.
86. rd.

at 3367.

at 3358.
87. 413 U.S. at 24.
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volving children is portrayed, and that those depictions at issue
lack serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific value."
Notwithstanding the explicit articulation of the Ferber
formula, intimations by the Court suggest an actual narrowing of
the social value inquiry to the point of insignificance, thereby
allowing for an even greater degree of first amendment infringement. The Court specifically restricted the first amendment interest to that of making the portrayals more "realistic" by utilizing children. 89 The Court added that the necessity of using
children for the above-stated purpose probably would not arise
often.90 In conjunction, the Court found that "[w]hen a definable
class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is
clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment,'''} This
statement suggests that the state's interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation will always be so overwhelming as
to outweigh any expressive interest at stake, presuming the applicability of a narrowly defined statute. Hence, the Ferber
formula essentially would remove all works containing actual
sexual portrayals of children from the realm of first amendment
protection.
The Ferber formula, including the aforementioned implications for its application, indicates an increasing willingness of
the Court to sustain the constitutionality of statutes embodying
compelling state interests, even where doing so would result in
sacrificing the sanctity of the first amendment. The perimeters
of this shift away from the approach of prior decisions may be
perceived in the concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor and
Justices Brennan and Marshall. In stressing that the Court did
not hold that New York must excise material with serious social
value from its statute, Justice O'Connor went so far as to suggest
that compelling interests may allow the state to regulate expression without regard for its social value.9l1 Conversely, Justice
88. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
89. 1d. at 3357-58.
90. 1d. at 3357.
91. 1d. at 3358.
92. 1d. at 3359.
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Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, asserted that regulation of expression with serious social value would violate the
first amendment. 11I Yet, even Justices Brennan and Marshall,
traditionally first amendment enthusiasts, joined the majority in
restricting the social value inquiry from the whole work to the
specific portrayals prohibited by statute. e4
The underlying reasons behind the Court's formulation of a
new standard in the realm of child pornography may be viewed
as twofold. Primarily, all members of the Court concurred that a
state has a compelling interest in protecting its youth from sexual abuse and exploitation. ell This interest may be distinguished
from those arising in other first amendment challenges, in that
the state seeks to protect a particularly vulnerable group of actors involved in the expression itself, rather than the viewers of
the particular expression. Additionally, the expression herein
concerned is overtly sexual, and while members of the Court
previously have expressed reluctance to allow state regulation of
purely sexual materials, the description of materials subject to
censorship under section 263.15 indisputably verges on the ambit of obscenity, an area of expression transgressing any first
amendment concerns."
Despite rendering a judgment premised on sound underlying considerations, and one which is largely consistent with previous opinions in the area of first amendment litigation, the
Court's analysis with respect to the social value inquiry revealed
a disturbing departure from precedent. In Roth v. United
States,e7 the Court resolved the social value inquiry by declaring
obscenity to be that which is "utterly without redeeming social
importance," stating further that "the portrayal of sex, e.g., in
art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason
to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press."es In Jacobellis v. Ohio,ee Justice Brennan
93. Id. at 3365.
94.1d.
95. The Court stated that it would not second-guess the legislative judgment. Id. at
3355.
96. Respondent's counsel conceded that a finding that the films are obscene would
have been consistent with the Miller standard. Id. at 3365 n.l.
97. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
98. Id. at 484, 487.
99. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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wrote, "Nor may the constitutional status of the material be
made to turn on a weighing of its social importance against its
prurient appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is utterly without social importance. "100 Justice Brennan adhered to
this position in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,101 by stating that "a
book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value. This is so though the book is found
to possess the requisite prurient appeal to be patently ofi"ensive."102 In Miller v. California, lOS the Court directed its inquiry
to "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."l04 Thus, the Ferber Court's
narrowing of the social value inquiry to the specific sexual portrayals at issue represents a clear departure from the wholework analysis of prior decisions.
This departure from the approach of prior decisions is unsettling because the Court is, in essence, denying first amendment guarantees to socially valuable expressions within a work
also containing child pornography. As Justice Brennan observed
in Ferber, "the limited classes of speech, the suppression of
which does not raise serious First Amendment concerns, have
two attributes. They are of exceedingly 'slight social value,' and
the State has a compelling interest in their regulation."loll By
having traditionally focused its inquiry on the entire work, the
Court had recognized that socially valuable expressions were to
be afforded at least some weight when ascertaining whether constitutional protection extended to the work at issue. Presumably, the Ferber Court narrowed the social value inquiry to the
individual portrayals in order to underscore the superiority of
New York's compelling interest over any existing first amendment concerns. However, this was unnecessary in light of the
Court's explicit use of a purported balancing test when it conclusively found the materials in Ferber to be without the protection
of the first amendment. The Court's balancing test, and the implications for its use in the realm of child pornography, alone
would have constituted sufficient grounds for upholding New
100. [d. at 191.
101. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
102. [d. at 419.
103. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
104. [d. at 25.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3365.
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York's statute against the first amendment challenge. lo8 Thus,
the Ferber Court's approach unnecessarily would have denied
recognition of any constitutional protection to expressions with
serious social value, had they existed.
Concerning the defendant's overbreadth challenge, the
Court essentially concluded that the New York statute was not
to be facially invalidated except on a determination of substantial overbreadth in its conceivable applications. In this respect,
the Court expressed doubt as to whether the impermissible applications amounted to more than a tiny fraction of all applications under the statute. While having found the New York statute not substantially overbroad, the Court nevertheless failed
to provide any guidelines for determining when a statute is
substantially overbroad for the purposes of the overbreadth
doctrine.
Justice Stevens would have refused to entertain an overbreadth challenge premised on first amendment concerns, opting
rather to review only the facts of each case. 107 While thereby
avoiding the problem of defining standards for substantial overbreadth, the implications of Justice Steven's approach admittedly are that a potentially overbroad statute would tend to result in a chilling of free speech because of self-censorship.lo8 In
support of his position, Justice Stevens minimized the adverse
effects of self-censorship as compared to the broad, unambigious
state-imposed censorship advocated by the majority. lOS Yet, selfcensorship potentially could result in a significantly more serious
chilling of free speech, primarily in situations involving highly
overbroad statutes. Thus, whereas Justice Stevens disagreed
with the majority and sought to afford "marginal speech," such
as the portrayals in Ferber, some first amendment protection, llO
his refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine in situations involving highly overbroad statutes would likely undermine his express intentions.
106. See discussion and accompanying text, notes 88·96, supra, as to the Ferber
formula and the implications of its application.
107. See supra note 82.
108. 102 S. Ct. at 3367.
109. rd.
110. rd. at 3367·68.
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Justice O'Connor's overbreadth· analysis, while consistent
with the majority in requiring substantial overbreadth for facial
invalidation, nevertheless focused on different factors when inquiring into the New York statute's conceivably impermissible
applications. Justice O'Connor asserted that "it is quite possible
that New York's statute is overbroad because it bans depictions
that do not actually threaten the harms identified by the
Court."111 This is distinguished from the Court's statement that
"[h]ow often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to
engage in conduct clearly within the reach of the section 263.15
in order to produce educational, medical or artistic works cannot
be known with certainty."llSI The Court's reference to the necessity of employing children signified that it was looking to expressions with serious social value as providing instances of potential
overbreadth. In limiting her overbreadth inquiry to ascertaining
whether there would be a substantial number of occasions in
which the state's compelling interest would be lacking, Justice
O'Connor more aptly taiiored application of the overbreadth
doctrine to the underlying rationale of the holding in Ferber.
That is, as it was the compelling interest of the state which, according to the Ferber formula, would remove all expressions
containing child pornography from the scope of first amendment
guarantees, only situations where such a compelling state interest would be substantially lacking would justify facial invalidation of the statute. Moreover, the type of situation contemplated
by Justice Stevens as a reason for refusing to entertain the overbreadth challenge would be equally well incorporated into Justice O'Connor's analysis, albeit without sacrificing the overbreadth doctrine altogether. 1l8
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's removal of child pornography from first amendment protection in Ferber was premised explicitly on the state's compelling interest in preventing
111. rd. at 3364.
112. rd. at 3363.
113. As a hypothetical of a potentially overbroad application, Justice Stevens offered the example of a foreign film cont.aining child pornography, where the juvenile
participant resided abroad. Justice Stevens noted that in such a case the state interest
would be far leBS compelling than in the present case. rd. at 3366-67. Similarly, Justice
O'Connor addreBBed a similar scenario as being an instance in which the compelling interests identified by the Court would not be triggered. rd. at 3364.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 6

494

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:475

sexual abuse and exploitation of its youth. The analysis employed in Ferber may be distinguished from that in other cases
raising first amendment issues, in that the majority of exceptions to first amendment applicability have been founded not on
the strength of the state's interest in suppression, but rather
upon a finding that the expression at issue lacked the socially
valuable aspects promoted by the first amendment. The unanimous decision in Ferber suggests the Court's willingness to part
from established modes of first amendment analysis in order to
sustain the constitutionality of laws embodying compelling state
interests.
While having found the prevention of child pornography a
compelling state interest, and one which by definition was so
overwhelming as to outweigh any expressive interests at stake,
the Court nevertheless failed to provide any guidelines for determining when other state interests might also be so compelling.
Thus, although the Court restricted the Ferber formula to application in the narrow realm of child pornography, the underlying
rationale of the Court could be applied to other areas traditionally protected by the first amendment. The inherent risks of creating exceptions to fundamental legal principles, such as child
pornography with respect to the first amendment, are that small
encroachments may lead to significant erosions. Such a prospect
is particularly alarming where the first amendment is concerned,
an amendment which embodies principles central to both our
system of law and government. Nevertheless, provided the
state's interest is in fact as compelling as that of New York in
Ferber, then first amendment infringement is not only compelling, but commendable.
Jon M. Bloodworth, 111*
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